An editorial by Heleen de Coninck, international climate policy researcher at ECN. The article was published in Dutch newspaper NRC Handelsblad on
21st December 2009.

The fifteenth Conference of Parties in Copenhagen, which aimed at a binding international climate treaty, failed to produce a credible result. Despite claims to the contrary made by world leaders and negotiators, this is the only possible conclusion.

Why is it so difficult to come to an agreement on climate change? The most important argument for preventing climate change is that the long-term costs of mitigation will be many times lower than the benefits. However, this long-term cost-benefit analysis shifts in the short term and at the national level. Countries such as the United States would earn little by preventing climate change, but would have to bear high costs to significantly reduce their emissions. The deep cuts in emissions that the United States would have to implement would require an energy revolution and structural economic changes. Many developing countries, however, are in the opposite situation: they are very vulnerable to the effects of climate change, but emit almost no greenhouse gases.

If emission reductions don’t work, try to agree on climate technology instead

Moral pressure
In such a situation, the ‘victims’ (the vulnerable developing countries) usually try to convince the ‘perpetrators’ (the industrialised world) to reduce emissions using moral pressure, financial compensation or coercion. Unfortunately, however, these vulnerable countries do not have the resources to provide compensation, nor the power to coerce the wealthy nations into action. The option therefore used is moral pressure – to which those who followed the negotiations can testify. With the support of the many demonstrators gathered in Copenhagen, the developing countries have wielded their moral indignation so well that they managed to demand billions in aid from the industrialized countries, on top of what those countries would have to invest in emission reductions. Although their cause is just, it does not convince the American Senate to ratify an international climate agreement.

Emission reductions and reciprocity
Thanks to the Kyoto protocol and many years of reasonably successful climate policy through emissions trading, especially in the European Union, the only acceptable outcome of an international climate treaty to most countries, companies and environmental organisations is emission reduction targets for industrialized countries. As this meets their moral appeal, the developing countries generally support this.
When it became clear that firm agreements on emission reduction would not be included in the Copenhagen Accord, many developing countries refused to approve it as a decision by the conference. The document, compiled by 25 of the most powerful global leaders, was only “taken note of” by a majority of Parties.
After Kyoto, Copenhagen again proves that countries that have to make big concessions, such as the United States, will also have to get something in return. Obama will never get an international treaty through the Senate if the benefits for the United States, preferably in terms of jobs, are not clear. Agreements on emission reduction do not provide sufficient reciprocity. It is counterintuitive and morally unjust, but what we need is an international treaty that rewards for the largest polluters for reducing emissions. Since the current international climate debate is based on who has the moral high ground (in part due to the demands of the developing countries), this urgently requires a complete reorientation of the debate.

A reorientation of international climate treaty
So what should we focus on then? If we cannot make international agreements on emission reductions, what can we agree on? The answer may lie in agreements on technological development, implementation and financing. Every country has an interest in technology. Firm agreements on the development and implementation of technology are in the interests of the United States and China, as they both produce climate technology and export expertise and installations. Extensive technology agreements could provide the reciprocity that agreements on emission reduction cannot, and would result in the same effect: lower emissions.
The results of Copenhagen in themselves offer little hope for climate change. They contain no guidance for the private sector to reduce emissions – no company will have to worry about stricter regulations any time soon. But even though Copenhagen was a missed opportunity, its results do offer some possibilities for a reorientation of the international priorities in the complex interest system of climate change. It enables for further discussion on technology and financing at future conferences. It provides seed capital to the amount of 30 billion for the next three years, which can be used to gain experience with technology instruments and agreements as the foundation for further negotiations.
The first ones who have to acknowledge that Copenhagen is not enough are those who drafted and signed the Copenhagen Accord. Conventional wisdom on what an international climate agreement needs to contain must be reconsidered, as the current paradigm is proving to be ineffective. Once we realise this, we can go on to create a healthy combination of national policy and international technology and financing agreements that are better suited to the complex system of conflicting and vested interests around climate change.

Contact
E-mail: Heleen de Coninck