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# **CIVIL PARTNERSHIPS, GOVERNANCE & THE UN**

**‘THE HISTORY OF PARTNERSHIPS LIES IN THE FUTURE, WAITING TO BE  
INVENTED, BY US’**

**BACKGROUND PAPER FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL’S PANEL OF  
EMINENT PERSONS ON CIVIL SOCIETY AND UN RELATIONSHIPS**

*PREPARED BY*

**SIMON ZADEK**

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UNIT A, 137 SHEPHERDESS WALK, LONDON N1 7RQ, UNITED KINGDOM

TEL: + 44 (0) 20 7549 0400; EML: [SIMON@ACCOUNTABILITY.ORG.UK](mailto:SIMON@ACCOUNTABILITY.ORG.UK); WEB: [WWW.ACCOUNTABILITY.ORG.UK](http://WWW.ACCOUNTABILITY.ORG.UK)

# CIVIL PARTNERSHIPS, GOVERNANCE & THE UN

Simon Zadek\*

## Inventing Tomorrow's History

John Maynard Keynes famously argued that what stops us in creating positive futures is not a shortage of good ideas, but our inability to let go of the past. We are heavily vested in particular ways of thinking about civil society: who is definitionally included and what is not, the basis of their legitimacy and the manner in which they bring about change. Similarly for the UN, where the pressure to reform is more than matched by the inertia that largely maintains it in its current form.

My brief was to consider the particular connection between the future role of civil society organisations in the UN and the phenomenon of 'partnerships'. In recognising the need to overcome the sort of inertia that Keynes refers to, the approach taken has been to address the brief by setting out two scenarios of how the links between partnerships and UN relations with civil society might be viewed from someone looking back from the year 2020. These scenarios are not meant to provide answers, they are not predictions or proposals. Rather, their function is to challenge the assumptions that guide our thinking and actions on this matter, and so allow us to reflect more openly on the available challenges and options.

The first scenario, Grey Dawn, is broadly negative and undesirable, whilst the second, Civil Governance, contains some of the possible strands of how we might wish civil society relations with the UN to evolve in the future.

The reflections emerging from this approach suggest that how the UN handles its future partnerships with non-state actors will be crucial in determining how it relates to civil society, in that:

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\* Simon Zadek is Chief Executive of AccountAbility. This paper has been prepared as a contribution to the UN's deliberations on its future relationships with civil society and non-state actors more generally. The paper has benefited from inputs from many people. It draws from Carmen Malena's background paper prepared for the UN Workshop convened by the Panel on UN-Civil Society Relations Pocantico, New York, February 2004, as well as AccountAbility's on-going programme of work on Partnership Accountability. The paper remains, however, the responsibility of its author.

### Looking Back from 2020

- ❑ Scenario 1: *Grey Dawn*, which shows how easily partnerships could become part of the problem, undermining both the UN and the legitimacy and effectiveness of civil society organisations.
- ❑ Scenario 2: *Civil Governance*, which shows how future circumstances could radically transform the basis on which the UN is impacted by partnerships and civil organisations, and in turn how they can best held to account.

- (a) Partnerships with non-state actors will increasingly impact on the core of the UN's future governance arrangements, moving beyond today's risky adventures formed for resourcing, operational or opportunist convenience.
- (b) Civil society's future engagement with the UN therefore has to be understood and designed as part of a wider design of the role of other non-state actors in the UN.
- (c) Civil society organisations in the UN may in the future have greater decision-making power, which will only be possible if the basis of their selection is reassessed along with the basis on which those selected can be held to account.
- (d) The ability and willingness of civil society organisations to evolve their own governance and accountability will be a crucial factor in determining their future relationship between the UN.

Hopefully these thoughts, although certainly not original, will serve their purpose in stimulating debate. More important, they might whet the appetite for as radical a set of changes aimed at reinvigorating the UN as those on which the institution was originally envisioned and created.

## Partnerships & Development

August 2002, some 60,000 people packed their bags to join in the World Summit on Sustainable Development<sup>1</sup>. Winter in Johannesburg. Its antecedents in Monterrey, Beijing, Copenhagen and Rio<sup>2</sup>, just to name a few, have all played crucial roles in driving forward progressive agendas. Beyond the events' themes, such summits generate change by ushering in new players and processes into the development process. Such Summits validate new players and processes by re-framing the challenge, re-assessing lessons from the past, and offering visions of how things can be different in the future.

The Johannesburg Summit was more than anything about partnerships. Just as Rio was as much about legitimising the role of NGOs in global governance as it was about the environment, Johannesburg was about the legitimacy of the role of business in development, working with public bodies and civil society organisations. Partnerships were simultaneously the Summit's silver bullet and *bete noir*. But the outcome, for better or worse (or both) was to usher in an era of 'partnerships for development', underpinned variously by missionary zeal, market-related, fiscal or statutory reasons.

### What is a Partnership ?

Partnerships are not by definition fair, equal or good. For our purposes they can best be understood as:

*"...agreements between one or more parts of the United Nations system and non-State actors in which all participants agree to work together to achieve a common purpose or undertake a specific task and to share risks, responsibilities, resources, competencies, and benefits."*<sup>3</sup>

But the die had in practice already been cast, and the Summit was more the 'blessing on the cake'. History may well point to an event two years earlier on July 26th 2000 in New York as best marking the day the roles of non-state actors in global governance were irrevocably changed<sup>4</sup>. On that day, the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, flanked by the world's most senior global civil servants<sup>5</sup>, hosted the inauguration of the Global Compact<sup>6</sup>. The name plaques announcing those in attendance highlighted

the significance of the moment. Arrayed around one of the UN's semi-circular chambers in New York were a powerful blend of business, NGOs and labour organizations - the architects of tomorrow's world. Present of course were the most well-known corporate giants, including BP, the Ford Motor Corporation, Rio Tinto and Shell and Unilever; some of the newly emerging corporate Titans, such as the Brazilian communications corporation, Globo, the Indian conglomerate, Tata, and the South African utilities company, Eskom. Also in attendance were businesses both traditional and new-found partners; including the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Human Rights Watch and the World Wide Fund for Nature. For the record, lining the back of the chamber in unmarked seats were representatives of many sovereign nations, unusually uncomfortable spectators of what was to come.

The Global Compact is one of a growing number of recently established partnerships that are seeking to redefine the terms on which non-state actors join with the UN and other public bodies in seeking to deliver public goods more effectively. These partnerships, whilst diverse in scope and form, in the main share two core aims:

- ✓ To harness the competencies of business and civil society in pursuit of local and global public goods.
- ✓ To establish new governance arrangements over the growing political and economic power of non-state actors.

These two objectives are clearly uncomfortable bedfellows. Yet they are the hallmark of today's governance challenge - where increased expectations of what responsibilities business and civil society can and should shoulder go hand in hand with a growing and visible unease about the manifest inadequacy of existing governance systems to accommodate these changing roles.

It is easy to criticise partnerships by pointing to examples of green and blue wash, and to reveal the real power imbalances between different 'partners in development'<sup>7</sup>. But it is important to recognise that these critics are more than balanced by those who welcome partnerships, including some of the today's most. Brazil's recent publication of its statutory framework for public-private partnerships signals their core role in Lula de Silva's development strategy, and Mandela's ever-closer relationship with the international business community in furthering his campaign against HIV/AIDS. Kofi Annan has been very clear on this issue:

<b>Partnership Myths and Truths<sup>8</sup></b>		
<b>Aspect</b>	<b>Endearing Myths</b>	<b>Enduring Truths</b>
<b>Ensuring that the Partnership Contains the Right Mix of Partners.</b>	Successful partnerships are those where partnering organisations share an interest in addressing common goals.	Successful partnership include the right combination of organisations to secure the necessary institutional mandates and delivery mechanisms to achieve the partnership's objectives and activities.
<b>Partner's Aims as Partnership Drivers</b>	Successful partnerships are primarily shaped around a common or shared long-term vision or aim.	Successful partnerships are those shaped around common or shared activities that first and foremost deliver against the legitimised individual aims of each partner.
<b>Process Method Key to Operational Success</b>	Individual champions are the key to successful partnerships, all the more so when diverse organisations are involved with very different aims and world views.	Methods for <i>building</i> partnerships are relatively interchangeable, but as the partnership is <i>operationalised</i> , structured methodologies become relatively more effective than approaches dependent on individual champions.
<b>Fractured Contexts Can Enhance Partnership Potential</b>	Partnership potential is greatest when the context ensures that partners are most receptive to, and knowledgeable of, each other.	Potential benefits from partnerships are often greatest exactly? where social, economic, and political uncertainties have historically constrained cooperation (although if the historical grievances are too great, this can also prevent the partners from coming together without an initial process of conflict resolution).
<b>International Dimensions Provide Key Experience and Leverage</b>	Partnership success is dependent on those most directly involved and with most at stake.	Partnership success often depends on individuals and organisations not directly involved that can bring critical experience and financial leverage, a feature of many partnerships involving business and the public sector.
<b>Evolving Partnerships</b>	Stable and clearly bounded partnerships are most likely to be effective.	A partnership's success can sometimes depend on its evolution, for example, in its membership and wider relationships, and in some instances even in its purpose.
<b>Direct Partnership Costs and Benefits</b>	Partnership costs are so high as to make them unprofitable for the participating business units.	Focused partnerships can yield net benefits to the participating organisations, including the business units, in both the short and long term.
<b>Extended Partnership Benefits</b>	Extending benefits beyond those directly arising through the partnership requires scaling up or replicating successful partnership experience.	Benefits beyond those arising directly within the partnership are most likely where there has been growth in participants' own abilities to work across sectors, and where these abilities are recognised and rewarded.

“When I speak about civil society, I don't mean only non-governmental organisations, though they are a very important part of it. I also mean universities, foundations, labour unions and - yes - private corporations.”

The dilemma is that today's partnerships are little more than a glimmer of what is to come. For this reason, one cannot usefully assess partnership futures on the basis of their current performance. Instead, we need to more directly imagine the future to better understand how partnerships can or should fit into tomorrow's governance framework. A 'back-casting' perspective would look back on tomorrow's events, say from the year 2020. From such a standpoint, what might happen in the years following the Johannesburg Summit would be facts at your fingertips, allowing you to judge the how partnerships had fared in practice.

### **Scenario 1: Grey Dawn**

Looking back from 2020<sup>9</sup>, the last two decades have been marked by the establishment of public-private partnerships as the development vehicle preferred by state and most non-state actors. Thousands were created in the first years following the Summit, rapidly becoming the entry-condition for accessing public funds for development. U.N. agencies were rewarded in the form of member state funding, media, and internal recognition for the volume of partnerships. Competition for engagement with top companies became fierce with firms becoming overwhelmed by the multiple uncoordinated overtures from what they thought was only one international organisation, rather than a system of numerous agencies.

Achieving scale meant bigger, not only more. Ever-larger and more ambitious partnerships were created, involving the world's largest corporations joined at the hip with under-resourced governments, multilaterals and civil society partners. Global partnerships became complex, multi-billion dollar enterprises with staff and offices sprawling across the continents. Partnerships increasingly became contract-based commercial arrangements, exporting the experience in Europe<sup>10</sup> and elsewhere of delivering public service through public-private partnerships funded through long-term guarantees of public sector financial subventions<sup>11</sup>.

Most partnerships, particularly the larger ones, suffered the same fate as their public sector predecessors. Personal, political and commercial interests replaced earlier

innovation based on social entrepreneurship. Cultures of low performance set in, driven by the high transaction costs and long start up times endemic to partnerships, a lack of focus and, increasingly, straightforward corruption. Public demand for greater accountability shifted their focus from business to partnerships, and from partnerships to their constituent partners, notably public bodies and civil society organisations. Calls for greater statutory regulation moved beyond business transparency and foreign direct liability as the first cycle of lawsuits emerged targeted at partnerships over their alleged misdemeanours. Partnerships began to appear as contingent liabilities rather than assets on company balance sheets as the risks increasingly outweighed the potential financial gains<sup>12</sup>.

By now, 2020, despondency has set in on the part of those who advocated partnerships, and frustration and anger by those who were more sceptical from the outset. The partnership approach has suffered the same ignominious fate as its antecedent, easy-win ‘silver bullets’ for development, nationalisation in the 1960s, and privatisation in the 1990s. We are once again facing the question of how best we can organise and finance effective development.

But history cannot be reversed. Our infatuation with partnerships over the years following the Johannesburg Summit impacted profoundly on the governance of our public institutions. The gap between *de jura* (what it says in the book) and *de facto* (reality on the ground) governance has never been greater. The UN General Assembly still exists but its relevance has steadily declined, symbolised by its lack of visibility to all but the many officials that service their endless debates and their, largely unheard and un-enforced, resolutions. Real decisions that direct the will of leaders and the world’s resources happen elsewhere, across the higher-level partnerships, Global Policy Networks (GPNs). These GPNs emerged during the decades following the Summit to cope with topics as diverse as HIV/AIDS and conflict diamonds, water resource rights and emission trading.

The upsurge in civil society engagement in such GPNs did not, deliver the expected democratic dividend. The very idea of ‘civil society organisations’ has become a misnomer through their steady corporatization. Their growing leverage through access to the UN and other bodies in practice de-linked them from their much-proclaimed constituencies, and made them dependent on business and politically-vested funders , leaving an air of sameness around the Board tables of most multi-stakeholder processes and institutions. Civil society’s increasing involvement in such partnerships left them

open to challenge. From the Republican right came attacks building on the early work of the American Enterprise Institute. From the progressive end of the scale came the more considered calls for NGOs to consider their position<sup>13</sup>. But repeated attempts over two decades to reinvigorate the basis on which NGOs could be held to account have failed, because NGOs simply would not accept the need for a maturing of their basis of accountability to their constituencies<sup>14</sup>.

Similarly for the UN. Two decades of intensive partnering has had its toll on its claims to independence as it has become embedded within networks of public and private institutions delivering complex blends of public and private goods. Its 'terms of engagement' in partnerships were constantly revised, but somehow never really grappled with the realities of the impact of its engagement with business and civil society on its operations, governance and legitimacy. Kofi Annan was the last Secretary General to truly represent the spirit of the UN's founders as his successors found themselves running an increasingly comprised institution in hoc to both political and business interests through their newly embedded relationships with business and special-interest non-profit organisations.

## **The Bottom Line**

But of course this is 2004, not 2020. None of this has really happened, although it might. The history of partnerships lies in the future, waiting to be invented, by us. The first scenario (although undoubtedly over-simplified) throws light on possible futures for partnerships that can guide today's policy decisions.

- (a) Today's 'partnerships' are prototypes for tomorrow's governance arrangements and programmatic delivery vehicles that need to embrace.
  - a. A rights-based approach to interpreting the universal values stewarded by the UN, with;
  - b. Multi-stakeholder and market-based approaches to mobilise and direct resources in seeking to realise these values in practice.
- (b) Tomorrow's partnerships must be based on more meaningful accountability than has been achieved to date, including the accountability of the partners themselves. Today's models of public sector bureaucratic and electoral-based

accountability, business-based fiduciary duty or civil forms of participation and network-based legitimacy are visibly inadequate.

- a. Far greater attention paid to how *business accountability* has to evolve to make performance more pro-development. In particular, today's statutory basis and interpretation of businesses' fiduciary duty is simply not consistent with business as a 'partner in development'<sup>15</sup>, irrespective of the potential to earn profit from being responsible<sup>16</sup>.
  - b. An acceptance of the need for *accountability of civil society organisations* to evolve in line with their growing governance roles and access to resources. Yesterday's bases of civil accountability - public empathy-based trust, donor reporting, and formulaic accreditation systems, will simply not do<sup>17</sup>.
  - c. A profound shift in our understanding of *public accountability*. The bureaucratic and political approach to hierarchical accountability common to most public institutions simply will not work in tomorrow's more complex blend of governance and operational models for delivering public goods<sup>18</sup>.
- (c) Reinventing the basis on which civil society should engage with the UN:
- a. Has to be framed in terms of the rights and responsibilities of civil society organisations as participants in the UN's governance.
  - b. Cannot be dealt with separately, as it has in the past, from dealing with the same issue for other non-state actors, notably the business community.
  - c. Must effectively and efficiently connect the hierarchy of governance from UN policy through to partnership accountability.
- (d) Civil society organisations' that wish to be part of a new governance compact covering policy development and resource allocation should demonstrate an adequate basis of accountability to the poor and marginalized.

With this bottom line in mind, we can redevelop our back-casting from 2020.

## Scenario 2: Civil Governance

Looking back from 2020, and contrary to the expectations of many, the decades following the Johannesburg Summit demonstrated our collective ability to confound the doomsayers, and evolve significant social innovations to address our changing environment and needs.

Seeking to cope with a growing resource deficit, the UN accelerated its engagement with better resourced and networked business, public bodies and civil society organisations. Such partnerships were envisaged as complementing the UN's core development expertise. But it soon became clear that such non-state actors were able to internalise such expertise, so reducing their need for any UN operational involvement.

The UN was in a sense returning to its roots. Rather than seeking to manage a sprawling global empire of thematic programmes, it began to focus again on its unique ability to convene the world's governing institutions to deliberate on, develop and enforce a framework of universally accepted values.

But the growing importance of partnerships created a governance challenge quite unlike the UN's older style projects and programmes. Partnerships involved institutions with attitudes and influence, and the ability to withdraw support. Many of the UN's new-found partners were not content to work within the confines of one partnership, but increasingly demanded a greater say in how the UN itself made decisions.

The upturn of this development was the UN Governance Convention of 2009, which set out the basis on which non-state actors could be incorporated into the UN's governance<sup>19</sup>. Now is not the time to recall the tortuous negotiation process and the host of subsidiary clauses that continue to make it difficult to effectively implement this crucial part of the deal. But the basics were as follows. The Convention, building on important early work at the now-defunct World Social Forum<sup>20</sup>, established a second UN Chamber, aptly named the Civil Chamber.

### Can Business Be Civil ?<sup>21</sup>

The term '*non-state actor*' covers both business and civil society. *Civil society* includes all organizations, networks, and associations between the level of the family and the level of the state, but is usually taken to exclude business. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), labor unions, and business associations form subsets of civil society, but business is excluded because it is assumed to exist to make and distribute a private profit. NGOs are further defined and differentiated from business as being non-profit organizations that are neither government nor business<sup>22</sup>.

This definition of civil society is helpful in clarifying the institutional and legally mandated aims of corporations like Shell or IBM. But it is less helpful in categorizing sections of the business community that exist, at least in part, to generate a social good or advance a collective interest. This would include cooperatives, and social and community enterprises. Moreover, for some civil society would include partnerships that combine traditional (including multinational) businesses with public and private, non-profit actors.

A business's contribution to sustainable development needs to be understood in terms of its viable options and what it makes of them. Internal and external factors together create a spectrum of possibilities at any point in time - or degrees of freedom - that defines a corporation's practical scope for action. Whether and how a corporation acts within its degrees of freedom is the fundamental test of responsibility.

*A 'civil organisation' is therefore one that, whether for example established as a business or a campaigning body, integrates social, economic and environmental objectives into its governance, policy development, practices and overall basis of accountability<sup>23</sup>.*

The Chamber was intended as, and remains, essentially a powerful dialogue partner to the General Assembly. It provides focused debate, and can table amendments to, and resist for a period of time the will of the General Assembly. It thereby plays a powerful ‘ombudsman’ role in the UN at the highest level, challenging and bringing into international debate aspects of sovereign state policy and practice. Since its establishment, the Civil Chamber has of course been testing the boundaries of its mandate, and it seems likely going forward that its executive power is likely to grow.

The Civil Chamber is currently made up of 832 elected organisational members, including NGOs, religious and labour organisations, and businesses. At one stage it looked as if there would be fixed numbers for each organisational category. But by then the distinctions were not clear-cut, and so the Civil Governance Code was agreed in Ulaan Baatar in 2011. This Code established eligibility to the UN’s Civil Chamber based on how an organisation was governed, rather than its functions or activities. Core was the requirement that an organisation establish a Civil Council to oversee strategy elected by a (non-paying) membership made up of impacted stakeholders<sup>24</sup>.

The Code was quickly adopted by a first rash of organisations wishing to make themselves eligible for the Civil Chamber. The unexpected level of take-up by businesses was helped, undoubtedly, by tempting tax incentives hitherto unavailable to commercial organisations. More surprisingly was the subsequent acceleration in take-up by many organisations, previously uninterested, in being nominated to the Chamber. This followed the publication of a study by the UN/World Bank’s joint Civil Governance Unit, which observed that organisations operating under Civil Councils performed materially better than previously, and also better than others operating with traditional governance frameworks<sup>25</sup>.

The Civil Chamber emerged from the recognition of the legitimacy of other routes along which the voices of people should be heard. This recognition was grounded in experiences of building and running operational and global policy partnerships. But just as the early partnership experience was shifting the UN’s approach to its own governance, it was also feeding back to impact on partnerships themselves.

As the numbers and scale of partnerships increased following the Johannesburg Summit, the terms on which they operated became increasingly subject to legally-binding contract, and therefore also to the courts. What had started as open development partnerships became closed to stakeholders, often even to the very

basics of civil inspection. With growing proportions of both public funds and private investments being channelled through such partnerships, there was growing concern as these developments.

The tipping point came in 2006, when a rash of court cases were initiated by Chinese human rights lawyers on behalf of community groups in Germany who had been denied access to water under the control of a public-private partnership. The success of the legal action, and the subsequent bankruptcy of several of the partnering business and civil organisations, created panic amongst the now hundreds of thousands of commercial and non-profit organisations involved in comparable partnerships. A high-level Roundtable of some of the world's leading partnerships was hastily called which, dominated by lawyers, called for legislation to establish a new legal form limiting partner liability.

The UN, by now dependent on partnerships for its arms and legs, stepped in, and brokered a deal which became known as the Global Partnership Convention. Under this Convention, a new, international legal status was created for partnerships giving them (and partners) limited liability. Mirroring the recently completed debates about the UN's Civil Chamber, it was agreed that this status would only be available to these partnerships that conformed to a three-pronged model of governance.

- ✓ That the partnership adopted the Compact's eleven UN Principles as a legal element of its own constituency.
- ✓ That the partnership conformed to a series of accountability measures covering transparency and access to its governance process for its own stakeholders, and in particular committed to a civil reporting standard<sup>26</sup>.
- ✓ That the partnerships Boards incorporated at least one, certified non-executive Director, whose task it would be to publicly report, annually, on the partnership's adherence to the terms of its protected status.

A new institution was created under the UN that provided regulatory oversight to this new agreement, which included establishing and monitoring the basis on which non-executive Directors were trained and certified, who by the time of writing this in 2020 numbered over 140,000 people.

Predictions in the early years of this millennium of the demise of the UN have therefore proved utterly wrong. Three extraordinary social innovations, the UN Civil Chamber, the related Civil Governance Code, and the Global Partnership Convention,

have together reinvigorated the UN's legitimacy and effectiveness. One more thing. Of course we should have realised that these innovations would migrate towards each other, creating yet further, unexpected developments in global governance. Partnerships adhering to the terms of the Convention quickly realised that they in fact complied with the terms of the Civil Governance Code, making them eligible for nomination to the Civil Chamber. They made very presentable candidates, being able to demonstrate more than others their multi-dimensional constituencies. Following the most recent elections in 2018, almost one third of the Chamber's members are in fact partnerships, and there is every sign that this will grow further in the future. As the Civil Chamber approaches its tenth birthday, we are seeing the ascendance of civil partnerships in the governance of the UN, and more broadly our global community.

### **End piece**

Evolving tomorrow's relationship between civil society and the UN is a complex, multi-faceted challenge. Aspects of this relationship can be consciously redesigned as a self-contained exercise. But this brief paper suggests that the important changes to this relationship cannot be self-contained in this way. They will be intertwined with the UN's broader evolution, and indeed with changes in the governance of development that go beyond the operations of the UN.

Designing change in the context of such dynamic complexity is common to all of today's major challenges. Normal problem-solving techniques and processes can be less helpful in such situations, since the inter-dependency between different issues can easily lead what the Chilean economist, Manfred Max-Neef, refers to as a state of 'perplexity', where we become so embedded in the present that we cannot see productive strategies for moving forward. Common in this situation is stalemate between major vested interests, and 'prisoner's dilemmas' where difficulties in mobilising collective action impede the adoption of strategies that all parties knows to be correct. Typically, outcomes in such circumstances are incremental and inadequate.

Scenarios are intended to help in overcoming such 'perplexity'. They are not predictions, although to be effective they need to describe futures that stakeholders view to be possible. Their intention is to reveal the relationship between systemic

change and the specific point of desired intervention. When effective, they illuminate the present in ways that create energy, agency and focus for change.

The particular scenarios set out above, *Grey Dawn* and *Civil Governance*, are hopefully a useful starting point. What this would mean is that they are discussed, probed, changed or, better still, rejected and replaced with other, improved scenarios. In this way, they would contribute to a process of radical design that locates changes in policy and practice in an appreciation of how these will play out in, and impact on the dynamic environment in which we all live.

## Endnotes

- <sup>1</sup> Drawn from S. Zadek (2003) "Partnership Futures", in *Partnership Matters: Current Issues in Cross-Sector Partnerships*, The Copenhagen Centre, Cambridge University Programme for Industry, and International Business Leaders Forum, Copenhagen: 8-11. This article was reproduced with a series of articles on 'partnership accountability in AccountAbility's *AccountAbility Quarterly 20 2002* ([www.accountability.org.uk](http://www.accountability.org.uk)).
- <sup>2</sup> The International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen and the Conference on Environment and Development in Rio.
- <sup>3</sup> Adapted from Nelson, J. (2002) *Building Partnership : Cooperation between the United Nations System and the Private Sector*, United Nations Global Compact Office, New York.
- <sup>4</sup> This section is drawn from S. Zadek (2002) *Third Generation Corporate Citizenship*, Foreign Policy Centre/AccountAbility, London.
- <sup>5</sup> The heads of the ILO, UNDP, UNEP, and the UNHRC.
- <sup>6</sup> An initiative involving the business community, and civil society and labour organisations to further the realisation of the core UN conventions and declarations covering labour standards, human rights and the environment; [www.unglobalcompact.org](http://www.unglobalcompact.org).
- <sup>7</sup> For example, see P. Utting (2000) *UN-Business Partnerships : Whose Agenda Counts?*, Paper presented at a seminar organized by the North-South Coalition, UNRISD, Geneva; and A. Zammit (2003) *Development at Risk : Rethinking UN-Business Partnerships*, UNRISD, Geneva.
- <sup>8</sup> Zadek, S. (2001) *Endearing Myths, Enduring Truths: Partnerships Between Business, Civil Society Organisations and Governments*, Business Partners for Development, Washington DC ([www.bpdweb.org](http://www.bpdweb.org)).
- <sup>9</sup> This might be looked at together with other back-casting pieces, such as S. Zadek (1999) "Looking Back from 2050". in *European Review of Business Ethics* July 1999 - Vol. 8 No 3.
- <sup>10</sup> Nelson, J., and S. Zadek (2000) *Partnership Alchemy: New Social Partnerships in Europe*, Copenhagen Centre, Copenhagen

- 11 IPPR (2001) *Building Better Partnerships: the Final Report on the Commission of Private-Public Partnerships*, Institute of Public Policy Research, London ([www.ippr.org](http://www.ippr.org)).
- 12 You will recall the onset of this when the French water utilities giant, Suez, withdrew from its water management contract in Buenos Aires in the early years of the millennium because of mounting losses linked to foreign exchange losses.
- 13 Zadek, S. (2003) "From Fear and Loathing to Social Innovation", in *Alliance*, Vol 8, No. 4: 21-24 ([www.accountability.org.uk](http://www.accountability.org.uk)).
- 14 See, for example, M. Edwards (2000) *NGO Rights and Responsibilities: A New Deal for Global Governance*, The Foreign Policy Centre, London.
- 15 Zadek, S. and M. Merme (2003) *Mainstreaming Responsible Investment*, World Economic Forum and AccountAbility Working Paper, AccountAbility, London. And also S. Zadek and M. Merme (2003) *Redefining Materiality*, AccountAbility, London ([www.accountability.org.uk](http://www.accountability.org.uk)).
- 16 See AccountAbility's [www.conversations-with-disbelievers.net](http://www.conversations-with-disbelievers.net) for reports and case studies on this topic.
- 17 [www.accountability.org.uk/research/default.asp?pageid=114](http://www.accountability.org.uk/research/default.asp?pageid=114)
- 18 Kaul, I. *et al* (2003) *Providing Global Public Goods*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- 19 UN (2009) *Treatise for the Establishment of a Second UN Assembly ("Civil Chamber")*, UN, San Jose
- 20 Mike Edwards and Simon Zadek suggested a second UN chamber in M. Edwards and S. Zadek (2000) "Governing the Provision of Global Public Goods: the Role and Legitimacy of Non-State Actors", in Inge Kaul *et al*, *Providing Global Public Goods*, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 200-224. George Monbiot made a related suggestion in setting out how a World Parliament might work in G. Monbiot (2003) *The Age of Consent: A Manifesto for a New World Order*, Flamingo, London.
- 21 Edwards, M., and S. Zadek (2000) "Governing the Provision of Global Public Goods: the Role and Legitimacy of Non-State Actors", in Inge Kaul *et al*, *Providing Global Public Goods*, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 200-224
- 22 Cohen, J. (2003) "Governance of and BY NGOs", *NGOs, Democratization and the Regulatory State*, European Policy Forum
- 23 Zadek, S. (2001) *The Civil Corporation: the New Economy of Corporate Citizenship*, Earthscan, London ([www.earthscan.co.uk](http://www.earthscan.co.uk)).
- 24 There are of course more detailed criteria underlying this arrangement, notably that the right to vote was linked to the length of time that one had been an active member, and that the Council 'seats' were divided into different constituencies.
- 25 UN/World Bank (2011) *Performance-based Civil Governance: the Evidence*, Civil Governance Unit, Ulaan Bator.
- 26 ACCESS (2006) *A Civil Reporting Standard*, ACCESS, Cape Town